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REPLY BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION
[. INTRODUCTION: THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This appeal from the Board and Division of State Lands and
Forestry arises from a decision jointly made and executed by those
agencies1 [hereafter jointly identified as "State Lands"] to dispose
of a state "school section" lying within a scenic and remote portion
of Capitol Reef National Park by accepting Garfield County's proposal to exchange that section for other lands owned by the County.
Because the parties1 first exchange of briefs has argued a wide
range of disparate issues bearing on this matter, consideration of
the issues may be aided by highlighting and focussing the central
questions presented. They include an important question about standards governing management and disposition of state school lands
which happen to possess important scenic, natural and recreational
values, as well as two significant and related questions about
public administrative practice.
Validity of flexible management designed to seek protection for
public values consistently with basic trust obligations
The fundamental substantive question presented is whether the
acknowledged duty of State Lands to protect the trust interest in
state "school sections" compels approval of proposals for profitable
disposition of those lands without regard for the presence of
important noneconomic values, otherwise legally protected, that
could be preserved by other feasible management alternatives.

1

The

The Board's major role in critical aspects of the decision
process and the Division's participation in an advisory rather than
decision-making role are summarized, with detailed citation to the
administrative record, in discussing the jurisdictional question at
7-9, infra.

State has argued that a rigid and confining concept of trust
obligations foreclosed consideration of these additional public
values•
NPCA responds that trust management obligations did not require
approval,

and would have permitted State Lands to defer disposition

in favor of interim or other management options that would protect
this land.

The case law relied on by the State announces broad

principles in the context of questionable dispositions.

But not a

single case holds, or even implies, that requirements for management
of trust lands would have been violated by avoiding or deferring
this land exchange while developing other management alternatives
more compatible with the legal protections otherwise afforded this
land.

On the other hand, at least one important case, Utah v.

Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979),

holds that school trust

obligations should be harmonized with relevant protective policies
(for wilderness) by recognizing a realm for application of
regulatory protections, while requiring regulation to remain
compatible with basic trust interests.
NPCA contends that the various legal standards and protective
policies applicable to this land, including the Board's policy on
"Management of Sensitive Areas," imposed a duty on State Lands to
identify, and based on proper findings to implement, modify or
reject, protective management alternatives to the extent compatible
with school trust obligations.
Need for relevant findings
For the above reasons, the second significant question
2

•resented by this case concerns the scope of proper administrative
.nquiry and findings.

Specifically, did State Lands, in acting to

iispose of these unique school section lands, comply with the basic
requirement that administrative agencies develop and make findings
or statements of reasons that address the relevant factual and legal
considerations?

The State argues that the Division Directorfs

"findings," for the first time disclosed to NPCA and this Court with
the State's answering brief, satisfies requirements for findings and
reasons.
NPCA contends that the limited findings prepared by the
Director (and only recently disclosed) failed to address most of the
issues raised by this exchange.

Not only did those "findings" fail

to identify or address the substantive issues argued by NPCA.

They

failed even to address issues central to application of the
standards acknowledged by the Director in his related declaratory
ruling.
Right of affected citizens to effective participation
The third significant question in this case is whether
interested citizens and citizen groups, upon proper showing of
standing and relevant substantive concerns, are entitled to
participate in proceedings involving disposition of school lands.
May State Lands lawfully exclude affected citizens and dispose of
state lands through exclusive negotiations between the agency and
the purchaser?

The State has contended that these transactions are

intended to embrace only the negotiating parties, and that
intervention is foreclosed.
3

NPCA contends that it was unlawfully denied effective
participation in this exchange proceeding, despite the fact that its
standing and the relevance of its substantive interest in this
matter were clear, uncontested, and even admitted by the agency.
Not only are due process concerns implicated by denial to citizens
of fair opportunity for effective participation.

Equally important

is the impact on the substantive validity of agency action.

Here it

is apparent that State Lands1 failure to address important issues
resulted, at least in part, from its refusal to permit effective
presentation of those issues in its exclusive "negotiation"
proceedings.
Declaratory rulings —
appraisal practices

particularly questioning State Lands1

Finally, this case presents other questions significant in the
management and disposition of state school trust lands, particularly
issues relating to the validity of appraisal procedures.

The State

argues that the Director properly declined to respond to requests
for declaratory rulings on appraisal procedures because NPCA had
shown no basis for an interest in those issues.
NPCA contends that its requests for declaratory rulings were
highly relevant to the issues presented by this exchange,
particularly its request for a ruling on the propriety of State
Lands1 practice of relying on appraisals paid for and supplied by
the proponent of a sale or exchange.

That practice seems, at best,

strangely in conflict with State Lands' repeated invocation of
unbending duty to honor school trust obligations.

4

EI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The State's arguments questioning the availability of

judicial review have already been addressed.

The challenges to this

Court's jurisdiction, as previously shown, do not rest on proper
interpretation of governing statutes and fail to recognize the
Board's deep involvement in making the challenged decision.
NPCA's standing is based on substantial interests not contested
actually acknowledged by the Director —

—

which it is entitled to

protect in these proceedings.
2.

Although its standing and the relevance of the concerns it

sought to present were never contested by State Lands, NPCA was
unlawfully denied intervention or other meaningful or effective
participation in these land exchange proceeding^.
3.

Contrary to the State's contentions, t^PCA has not argued

that legal and policy protections for public values on state school
lands "abrogate" school trust obligations. But NPCA does contend
that those protections can and must be accommodated, where otherwise
feasible, by implementing management alternatives that are
reasonably compatible with trust obligations.
(A)

State Lands does not seriously contest the fact that

the Capitol Reef state section and adjacent Iannis have been
recognized by National Park designation and in Rational Park Service
management plans for their unique scenic beauty, pristine natural
character, and important recreational opportunities.
(B)

The scenic, natural and recreational values of the

Capitol Reef section and adjacent lands are subject to protection
5

under policies derived from several legal sources including the
nonimpairment requirements of the National Park System Organic Act,
Utah's statutory multiple use policy for management of state lands,
public trust concepts, and the values recognized by the Boardfs own
policy statement on "Management of Sensitive Areas."
(C)

Decisions affecting this state school section must be

governed by these applicable protective policies insofar as they can
be implemented through management alternatives that are reasonably
compatible with school trust obligations.
4.

Despite availability of compatible management options, the

exchange decision was based on a rigid concept of school trust
obligations to "maximize" current economic return that precluded
consideration of those protective options.
5.

The case law on trust management obligations neither holds

nor suggests that it would be inconsistent with school trust
obligations for the agency to exercise its management duties by
deferring current profitable disposition of a school section while
developing management alternatives adequate to protect unique public
values on those lands.
6.

Although the public values of this state section were

beyond dispute, State Lands made no inquiry and prepared no findings
to address the feasibility of protecting those values compatibly
with trust interests. The limited administrative findings

prepared

in support of this exchange fail to address or consider application
of the relevant protective standards;

fail to address even those

elements relevant to application of the standards articulated in the
6

Director's declaratory ruling;

and fail to make any findings

concerning the feasibility of accommodating any of these standards
tfith school trust management principles.
7.

As argued in NPCA's request for declaratory rulings, an

appraisal independent of the proponents for a sale or exchange
should be required by both school trust standards and state
statutory requirements.
III. ARGUMENT
1.

Availability of Judicial Review
(A)

Jurisdiction.

With respect to the jurisdictional issues,

NPCA relies upon Petitioner's Memorandum In Opposition To
Respondents' Motion For Summary Disposition at 1-6. In addition:
(a) The State's reliance on the 1988 amendments to this
Court's jurisdictional statute (Brief of Respondents at 16 n.12) is
strained, at best, since all relevant actions took place in 1987
and this appeal was taken prior to the amendment.

If the 1988

amendment limiting direct review of the Board to "formal"
proceedings is relevant at all, then related procedural inadequacies
must also be considered.

Although the new Utah Administrative

Procedures Act requires designation by rule for a matter to be
treated as an "informal" rather than "formal" proceeding, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-4, the Board had adopted no rules for designation
until 1988, after these proceedings were completed. (Brief of
Respondent at 19.)
(2)

The decisions challenged by this petition are reviewable

because Utah Code Unannotated § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) authorizes direct
7

review by this Court of Board decisions. The State acknowledges that
under Adkins v. Board of State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524
(Utah 1986), the Board should not have exercised any decisional role
because "the Division alone is authorized to make administrative
decisions for the management and disposition of state lands."
of Respondent at 16.

Brief

But the State's argument apparently rests on

the fiction that the Board did comply because it should have
complied.

To the contrary, the record demonstrates the Board's

central role in critical aspects of the decision process, as well as
the Division's advisory rather than decision-making role.

The

Division's memorandum to the Board analyzing the exchange proposal
was clearly cast as a guide to decision by the Board, even to the
extent of summarizing decisional alternatives followed by a "Staff
Recommendation" favoring "Alternative No. 4 —

to approve the

concept of an exchange . . . ." Board Memo dated July 27, 1987,
items G and H, pp. 5, 6 [R.35-36]

The Board also debated the merits

of the specific decision at length before acting on "the Staff's
recommendation . . . that the exchange be approved as to concept
subject to further

evaluation"; and the Board then unanimously

approved a motion to "approve the Staff's recommendation."

Minutes

of Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, p. 3 0 (Sept. 11,
1987)(emphasis added). [R.54]

Similarly, the Director's formal

action approving the exchange expressly rested on the premise that
"the Board approved the concept of exchanging State land described
as [the disputed state section]." Record of "Formal Action" by
Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry, p. 13 (Dec.
8

21, 1987). [R.89]
(B)

Standing:

NPCA relies upon its prior Submissions in

Petitioner's Memorandum In Opposition To Respondents' Motion For
Summary Disposition at 6-12.

In addition, it should be emphasized

that even the Director of the Division recognized NPCA's standing in
this matter, specifically holding that he was required to respond
to NPCA's declaratory ruling request #7 because "NPCA has provided
adequate information relative to NPCA's stake in the resolution" of
the proposed exchange.

Response to declaratory iruling requests by

letter dated Dec.21, 1987, from Division Director Patrick D. Spurgin
to Chris Wangsgard, p.2. [R.84]
(C)

Scope of Review:

Under Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v.

Pub. Serv. Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (1983), this Court should apply
the standard of "correction of error" in reviewing State Lands'
errors in interpretation of school trust management obligations and
their relationship to other legal policies protecting public values
on school lands.

That test also should govern in determining

whether the agency identified the requisite issues of law for its
findings, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Pub. Serv. Com'n,
636 P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981), while the logic or completeness of
those findings should be reviewed under the rationality test, 658
P.2d at 611.
2. NPCA was unlawfully denied effective participation in these
"negotiated" exchange proceedings
In denying intervention, the Director nowhere challenged the
adequacy of NPCA's interest or basis for standing.

Thus, the effect

of the Director's ruling, if permitted to stand, is that parties
9

with concrete interests and credible substantive concerns will be
unable to protect those interests in State Lands1 exchange
proceedings, regardless of how severely they may be affected.

That

result is clearly contrary to this Court's continuing concern that
parties injured by agency proceedings have a fair opportunity to be
heard. Cf. R.W. Jones Trucking, Inc. v. Public Service Commission,
649 P.2d 628 (1982), relying on Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939) and Armored
Motors 3Service v. Public Service Commission, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464
P.2d 582 (1970); Utility Consumer Action Group v. Public Service
Commission, 583 P.2d 605, 608 (1978), cited approvingly in Utah Dept
of Admin. Services v. Public Serv. Commission, 658 P.2d 601, at 608,
n. 8 (1983) .
The State suggests that NPCA's effort to intervene in these
exchange proceedings was "untimely." Brief of Respondent at 45. But
the State does not explain why a detailed request, submitted more
than two months before final action on this exchange, should not
have been honored.

Letter styled "Petition to intervene" dated Oct.

14, 1987, from Terri Martin and Chris Wangsgard to the Board and
Director of State Lands and Forestry. [R.61-64

] The only

explanation offered was the Director's assertions, in his letters
dated Nov. 16, 1987, to Terri Martin and Chris Wangsgard, that —
the Division . . . has no procedures under which a request
for intervention in . . . an exchange proposal might be
granted. . . . [A]n exchange application . . .is not
viewed as an adjudicative action under present law.
Rather, it is in the nature of a proposal for negotiation
. . . [for] a mutually beneficial transfer of property . .
. dependent on the willingness of the parties to trade . .
. . At present, we see no basis for interjection of a
10

third party
[.

into such a negotiation process.
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he would "welcome any information related to the value of the
affected properties or any alternative which you may have to offer.11
Brief of Respondents at 46.

Letters from Division Director Patrick

D. Spurgin to Chris Wangsgard and NPCAfs Terri Martin dated Nov. 16,
1987. [R.94,95]
At that time, however, neither the "net economic benefit"
standard, nor any other, except rote "maximization" of value, had
been acknowledged. And a month earlier NPCA had requested
interpretive rulings on the applicable standards, specifically to
guide its participation and submissions.

Letter styled "Requests

for Declaratory Rulings" dated Oct. 14, 1987, from Terri Martin and
Chris Wangsgard to the Board and Director of State Lands and
Forestry. [R.65]

At the same time, NPCA had specifically requested

a short deferral of proceedings so that it might consider the
Division's view of the governing standards in preparing any further
proffer. Letter styled "Petition to intervene" dated Oct. 14, 1987,
from Terri Martin and Chris Wangsgard to the Board and Director of
State Lands and Forestry, p. 4. [R.68]
These circumstances highlight the importance of (then) Judge*
Burger's observation in

Office of Communication of the United

Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), that—
The theory that the Commission can always effectively
represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding
without the aid and participation of legitimate listener
representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys
general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to
work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When
it becomes clear .. . that it is no longer a valid
assumption which stands up under the realities of actual
experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to
rely on it.
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-ch/
_v, ely

reason, it is essential for the Board —
Court to require the Board —

and lacking that, for this

to recognize these protective legal

policies and give them appropriate weight in seeking management
alternatives that can accommodate school trust principles.
At a minimum, the Board here was required to identify the
applicable protective policies and make relevant findings on the
feasibility of, and degree to which, compliance with these policies
could be achieved consistently with the legal requirements of trust
management.
Not only did the Board fail to consider the extent to which
protective policies were applicable or could be accommodated.

It

also failed to make findings on many critical issues discussed infra
at 30-33.

But even if the governing standards were no more

protective than those asserted in the Director's "declaratory
ruling" in this matter fR.85-871, the findings offered in this case
(and belatedly incorporated in the record) fail to address critical
issues identified by that ruling.

Rather, despite the Director's

recognition in his declaratory ruling of criteria for decision at
least partially responsive to the protected values of these lands,
the record discloses no inquiry and no findings addressing key
issues posed by those criteria.
Indeed, only with the State's answering brief were NPCA or this
Court advised that any administrative findings were made in support
of the decision to approve this land exchange.
at 8, 53.
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Brief of Respondents

(A)

The undisputed scenic, natural and recreational values of
the Capitol Reef state section are protected under several
legal standards that must be accommodated with school
trust management obligations
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let of Respondents at 3, n. 5, suggests that the summary
of the Park's 1982 General Management Plan indicated significant
development in the area of the state section, including, e.g., a newroad. The State failed to recognize that the summary on which it
relied merely referred to one of the alternative plans analyzed in
the EIS, not the "preferred" plan approved by the Park, See Capitol
Reef FEIS General Management Plan, Statement of Findings at iv and
26, 28. The State also argues that the state section is not within
official wilderness recommendations, but does not dispute that the
adjacent park lands north and south of the section are recommended
for park wilderness. The 1987 Park Service statement cited by the
State emphasizes reason for concern about this section, explaining
that "the MPS can exercise little formal control over these lands
and, potentially, uses of the lands could occur that would have a.
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"scenically spectacular and strategically critical location" of the
section within Capitol Reef National Park, or its relationship to
adjacent areas, both north and south, that are recognized by the
National Park Service for their wilderness and recreational values.
Brief of Petitioner at 9-10•
(B)

Legal standards derived from several sources protect the
important scenic, natural and recreational values of the
Capitol Reef section, subject to accommodation with trust
obligations

NPCA has previously submitted substantial argument that the
scenic, natural and recreational values within and adjacent to the
Capitol Reef state section are within the scope of legal protections
afforded by: (i) the National Park Service Organic Act and its 1978
amendments [Brief of Petitioner at 35-37];

(ii) Utah's statutory

multiple use policies [Brief of Petitioner at 37-38]; and (iii)
common law "public trust" obligations to protect unique natural
values [Brief of Petitioner at 38-44]; and (iv)

the Board's own

1984 policy statement on "Management of Sensitive Lands"

[Letter

dated Dec. 18, 1987, from Chris Wangsgard and Terri Martin to the
Board and Director of State Lands and Forestry, pp. 3-4 [R.78-79];
Brief of Petitioner at 54-55.] (Attached as Appendix A.)
The Board's own policy statement on "Management of Sensitive
Areas"3 constitutes a clear recognition of the obligation to seek
negative impact on adjoining parklands." Capitol Reef National Park,
Statement for Management at 28. (July 1987; emphasis added).
3

The terms of the statement, including its lack of specific
enforcement provisions, appear to meet the definition of "policy" in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2 (10)(a), rather than that of a "rule"
under subsection (13) which would require valid rulemaking
procedure. State Lands has offered no showing that this policy had
16
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NPCA, however, has never contended that these protective
policies override or abrogate school trust policies.

Rather, we

contend that it is the duty of decision makers to seek management
alternatives that will give effect to these protections while
accommodating the requirements of trust management.

Under that

view, school trust principles do not automatically or
comprehensively override other valid protective policies; and these
protective policies are displaced only to the degree that reasonable
management programs cannot develop other protective alternatives
that are compatible with basic school trust obligations.
It is essential, then, for the decisionmaker to recognize these
protective legal standards and give them appropriate weight in
seeking management alternatives that are also reasonably compatible
with school trust principles.

That is exactly the position taken by

the Court in Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 995 (CD. Utah 1979),
relied on by State Lands.

Brief of Respondents at 35.

Far from

recognizing any unqualified state right to develop school trust
lands,

the Court pursued an approach that sought to "resolve the

issues and effect a balance of interests" based on analysis of the
interest involved and its statutory base.

486 F.Supp. at 1001.

In Utah v. Andrus. the owner of mining claims on state school
trust lands and the Utah Division of State Lands (as intervenor)
defended against claims brought by the Bureau of Land Management for
injunctive relief against road construction through a "wilderness
study area" (WSA).

The mining claimant and the State urged that

statutory and regulatory protections for WSAs could not interfere
18
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accommodate them to the basic school trust obligations, suggests a
much different resolution of the instant case than that reached by
State Lands. Unlike Utah v. Andrus, there were many unexplored
management options here that could have preserved the protective
policies and values without significant intrusion on the value of
the trust lands held by the State.

But neither inquiry nor findings

were addressed to those possibilities,
4.
Despite availability of compatible management options, the
exchange decision was based on a rigid concept of school trust
obligations to "maximize" current economic return that precluded
accommodation with reasonable protective options.
State Lands' decision to proceed with the exchange was
rationalized on the basis of a rigid and incorrect view of its trust
obligations which foreclosed any consideration of reasonable
management options that would accommodate protections for the
Capitol Reef section with trust concepts. Both the limited
administrative findings and other significant portions of the
record, as well as the State's brief, justify this exchange on the
ground that the Board and Division were obligated to disregard
available exchange options or other more protective management
alternatives because of a duty to maximize current return on current
trust assets.
The Division Director's findings, belatedly offered in support
of the exchange decision, made it clear that this rigid viewpoint
led State Lands to decline consideration of other more protective
management alternatives, such as deferral of disposition pending
development of a State-Federal exchange:
20

[W]hile there may be certain non-economic values on the
land, the State can affirmatively act to preserve and
protect those values only if there is a net economic
benefit to the school trust that will be realized by such
protection. In accordance with trust duties, the State
cannot unduly speculate that such conditions are present;
and no information has been presented to indicate that the
conditions are in fact there. On the contrary, current
information compels the conclusion that failure to proceed
with an exchange which would result in an increase in the
value of the State trust land inventory (as is the case
with the lands offered by Garfield County) would be a
breach of trust duty.
Statement On The Exchange Of Land Between The Division Of State
Lands And Forestry And Garfield County Related To The Switchbacks
Section Of The Burr Trail at 3. (No attribution and undated.)
[R. 97]

That position also obviously led State Lands to the

incorrect assumption that it had no independent obligation to
develop information and options that might include more protective
alternatives.
Earlier, the Division's recommendations to the Board explicitly
relied on the same rigid view as the basis for disregarding the
alternative of a State-Federal exchange pursuant to the then-recent
Memorandum of Understanding between the State and the Interior
Department:
FLPMA requires value for equal value exchanges, but trust
duties suggest that from the trust perspective some
additional, non-speculative benefit to the trust must be
realized. Also, as noted, benefits must be maximized. So
long as benefits of the MOU exchange are assumed, they do
not support the completion of the exchange. Until
selected lands are finally identified, it is difficult
for the Board to determine whether the MOU is ultimately
consistent with trust duties. In fact, it will be well
into the BLM evaluation process before the true
feasibility of the exchange of many of the selected lands
will be clear.
Accordingly, the status of the MOU exchange, even if it is
assumed to conflict with the Garfield County exchange,
21

does not presently provide a basis for denying the
application submitted by the county.
"Board Memo" dated July 27, 1987, p 4. [R.34]; Minutes of The
Regular Meeting Of The Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, Sept.
11, 1987, p. 23. [R.47].(Emphasis added.)

That analysis was

apparently the basis for disregarding the State-Federal land
exchange policy and mechanisms established in the MOU, because even
the Board Memo recognized that "in several respects existing policy
does not apply to this proposal." Board Memo at 6. [R.36]
The notion that other management alternatives were precluded by
a requirement that the exchange return a current short-term net
benefit was reflected in other advice from the Division.

Expressly

recognizing that, "with the exception of exchanges such as the MOU
exchange," land exchanges are ordinarily initiated by interested
third parties, the Division advised:
Accordingly, exchanges almost always arise due to, and are
motivated primarily by, benefits sought by an outside
party. There is, therefore, a credible argument that an
exchange of value for equal value is a breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty unless some other net benefit is
realized by the trust in the exchange.
Board Memo at 3 [R.33]; Minutes at 22. [R.46](Emphasis added.)

The

demand for an immediate net benefit apparently relied on the related
view, expressed in the same Memo, that the Board's fiduciary duty
included

—

a duty of loyalty, i.e., the Board must strive to benefit
the trust beneficiaries and may not have, as its purpose,
the benefit of a third party (particularly when no net
benefit is realized by the trust)
Board Memo at 3 [R.33]; Minutes at 21. [R.45]

Obviously, that

position gives no consideration to possibility that the extrinsic
22

"benefits" may arise from the need to accommodate other statutory
obligations of protective management, rather than the conflicting
interests of a third party.
A similar, and even more rigid expression of the "maximization"
duty was asserted by the Director, also in discussing the exchange
alternative under the State-Federal MOU, in a letter dated Sept. 23,
1987, to Tom Hatch, Chairman of the Garfield County Commission:
The MOU provides administrative guidelines for exchanging
State lands which are entrapped within Federal
reservations for Bureau of Land Management lands. The MOU
does not and cannot change substantive principles which
are applicable to trust land management. Those principles
require that we seek maximum benefit for the trust
beneficiaries.
[R.58] (Emphasis added.)

The Director's response to NPCA's

requests for declaratory rulings, though expressed in somewhat less
strident terms, nevertheless adopts the same approach:
To the extent that there exist several options for dealing
with trust property and the protection of non-economic
values is necessary for maximizing the economic value of
the property, such protection may be prudently undertaken.
Declaratory ruling # 7, p. 5. [R.87] (Emphasis added.)
Under the regime of this interpretation, it is evident that no
weight is given to the principles recognized in Utah v. Andrus,
supra, which seek to accommodate applicable protections for unique
public values with trust obligations.
Director's ruling —

Crucially missing from the

and from the view that dominated State Land's

decision in this case —

was any recognition that short-term

dispositions were not required where development of management
alternatives could be developed that would accommodate both the
protective and trust management obligations.
23

5.

School trust principles do not foreclose protective
management alternatives.

The rigid view of "trust" obligations on which State Lands
rationalized its approval of this disputed exchange and its failure
to consider alternative management options is neither compelled nor
suggested by the case law on which the State relies.

Not only would

that approach foreclose reasonable accommodation with other policies
affecting trust lands.

If taken at face value, it would also

handicap rational efforts to adopt strategies of trust management
that consider long-term as well as short-term economic prospects, or
reflect adequate consideration of future as well as current
beneficiaries of the trust.
Under its rigid rationale, State Lands purported to find a duty
to approve Garfield County's exchange proposal because it was
obligated to obtain a "net economic benefit" from the proposed
exchange transaction, and because opponents had failed to show that
greater "net economic benefit" would arise from any alternative
course. [R.97]

Unexplained, but a necessary part of that position,

was an unarticulated conclusion that trust obligations impose a
rigid preference for current disposal rather than retention and
alternative management of trust lands whenever an opportunity arises
that will yield the requisite "net economic benefit."
The confining rigidity of that approach is well-demonstrated by
the declination to consider management options that would preserve
other important protected values while working out arrangements for
the State-Federal exchanges contemplated by the MOU, only recently
executed between the State of Utah and the Department of the
24

Interior.

The recitation in the Director's "findings" that "the

State cannot unduly speculate" that "net economic benefit" would
arise from other, more protective management options [R.97]
obviously drew on the similar views expressed in the Division
staff's recommendations to the Board.

The staff had opined that "so

long as benefits of the MOU exchange are assumed," they do not meet
the requirement that "benefits must be maximized," and that "until
selected lands are finally identified, it is difficult for the Board
to determine whether the MOU is ultimately consistent with trust
duties."

Minutes at 23. [R.47]

concluded that

On that basis, the Division

"the status of the MOU exchange, even if it is

assumed to conflict with the Garfield County exchange, does not
presently provide a basis for denying the application submitted by
the county." Id.
Initially, it should be observed that the above rationale, if
taken at face value, would almost always compel preference for
current dispositions over longer-term management options.

State

Lands could seldom hope to work with certainties in developing
management options that look to future rather than current values.
Under that view, then, State Lands would be compelled to favor most
current dispositions over interim or longer-term planning; and it
would be severely inhibited, if not prevented, from choosing
flexible management options designed to achieve a range of valid
management objectives.

In addition to foreclosing efforts at

accommodating trust principles with protected public values on trust
lands, these heavy restrictions on the management options for school
25

lands would constrain efforts to anticipate future land values or to
benefit future members of the open class of trust beneficiaries.
NPCA submits that none of the cases relied upon by the State
support this rigid view of school trust obligations or foreclose
consideration of interim or longer-term management options that may
include accommodation of protected public values. None of the cases
even involved challenges to interim management judgments which
favored retention over disposition or deferred disposition in favor
of developing alternative management options.
NPCA's first brief emphasized that all of the cases on which
the State relies for establishment of trust duties involved
challenges to the propriety of disposition actions by which trust
lands had been diverted wholly or in substantial part from trust
holdings.

Brief of Petitioner at 45-46.

the State's answering brief.

The same remains true of

Thus, for example, the key case of

Lassen v. Arizona Highway Department. 385 U.S. 458 (1967), dealt
with grants of materials sites and rights of way on school trust
lands to the state highway department without compensation.

The

Court held that those dispositions required compensation to the
trust, though it waived certain of the rigid enabling act
requirements for determining the amount of compensation and
permitted use of any procedures "reasonably calculated to assure the
integrity of the trust." 385 U.S. at 465.
The Supreme Court's focus on the propriety of or values
received from dispositions is also demonstrated by Alamo Land &
Cattle Co. v. Arizona. 424 U.S. 295 (1976), where the dispute
26

concerned proper distribution of condemnation compensation between
the state trust fund and a lessee of the condemned state lands.
Strangely, in fact, Alamo can be taken as recognizing that other
legal obligations do give rise to other legal interests that may
qualify trust interests. Thus, the Court held that, despite rigorous
limitations on dispositions arising from the specific provisions of
the relevant enabling act, property law defining the lessee's
interests entitled the lessee to a portion of the condemnation
judgment reflecting its leasehold (as distinguished from the trust's
reversionary) interest in the property. 424 U.S. at 306-07.
Although it involves use of trvist lands for a park, the
significance of State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska
1981), is also relevant only as a limitation on dispositions.
There, the state legislature had disregarded the trust status of
certain lands and had included the land in establishing a state
park. Holding that disposition could not simply disregard the land's
trust status, the Court rejected the state's argument that it could
simply take the land for park purposes under it4 general multiple
use authority. Finding inverse condemnation in favor of the trust
beneficiary, the court remanded the case for appraisal of value. 62 4
P.2d at 816. Nothing in the case, however, suggests that interim
management to preserve the land pending development of advantageous
alternatives would have offended the trust.
Cases like Oklahoma Ed. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla.
1982) are obviously confined to improper dispositions, as are the
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Utah and other state cases cited in the State's brief, ^ and offer no
basis for relevant refinements of their generalized recitals of
broad trust principles.
Although, NPCA does not dispute the relevance of common-law
trust principles in assessing the validity of decisions in managing
school trust lands, the State has failed to identify the nature of
the school trust under the common law.

The United States Supreme

Court as well as this state's attorney general have characterized
school land grant trusts as charitable trusts.

See Springfield

Township v. Quick, 63 U.S. 56 (1859) (enabling acts create trusts
similar to private charitable trusts); Trustees of Vincennes
University v. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 (1852) (same); Informal
Op. No. 85-62 Utah Att'y Gen. 12 (1985) ("It is clear under [Utah
law] . . . that the land grant trust is a 'charitable trust."1).
A charitable trust differs from a traditional private trust in
that the benefits it provides are "intangible advantages to mankind
b

Jensen v. Dinehart. 645 P.2d 32 (Utah 1982) involved a
dispute over allocation of current mineral income from trust lands
between the State School Fund and the Uniform School Fund. Coleman
v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Ut. 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965) merely
affirms the Board's action in putting mineral leases on newly
acquired land up for public bidding rather than awarding a lease to
the first applicant. Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 104
Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943) determined that property acquired by
the trust pursuant to foreclosure on investment of trust funds was
held by the Land Board in a governmental capacity and was thus
exempt from property taxation by the county. Finally, in Ebke v.
Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W.2d 520
(1951), the lands in question were to be disposed by renewal of
leases, and the only question was whether the price should be set
through public bidding requirements or in compliance with state
statutes that provided for renewal of leases on trust lands based on
6 percent of an arbitrarily determined fair market value. The Court
held that the latter method would be incompatible with obligations
to the trust.
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or some considerable class thereof which improve its condition
mentally, morally, physically or in some similar manner.11 G. Bogert,
The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 363 at 17 (2d. Ed. 1978).

Quite

often, as is the case with Utah's school trust, the class receiving
the benefits of the charitable trust constitutes an open class: the
trust obligation runs to future as well as present beneficiaries,
because the purpose of the trust is to bestow a benefit to society
rather than to specified individuals.

Since this is so, the trustee

of such a trust "must be concerned both with income for current
beneficiaries and the preservation of trust assets for future
beneficiaries." Informal Op. No. 85-62 Utah Att'y Gen. at 12; see G.
Bogart supra § 541 at 157.

In its present posture, the instant case

does not require a determination of the extent to which that duty
may require specific consideration of scenic, natural and
recreational values; but the nature of the duty certainly emphasizes
that the trustee is not obliged to dispose of trust assets as soon
as an economic opportunity becomes available.

Thus, the trustee may

wait for a better opportunity in the future without violating the
trust obligations.

See Informal Op. No. 85-62 Utah Att'y Gen. at

13; McCormack, Land Use Planning and Management of State School
Lands, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 525, 545-56.
Contrary to its narrow view of its duties, then, the Board had
no duty to proceed with the Garfield exchange.
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6.
Although the public values of this state section were beyond
dispute. State Lands made no inquiry and prepared no findings to
address the feasibility of protecting those values consistently with
trust interests.
Under the approach suggested above, then, it is obvious that
State Lands should have considered a variety of management
alternatives that would have been more compatible with valid
protective standards than this land exchange.

As NPCA argued to the

Board [R.52], and as the Division [R.31] and Board [R.43] also
expressly recognized, a detailed framework and procedure for
developing land exchanges between the State, BLM and the Park
Service had just been established under a Memorandum of
Understanding between the State of Utah and the Department of the
Interior dated May 19, 1987.

[Attached to this brief as Appendix

B.]
In addition to the MOU provision to facilitate State-Federal
exchanges, the Secretary of the Interior also has clear authority to
carry out individual land exchanges to resolve inholdings within
Capitol Reef National Park, subject to agreement by state or local
entities.

16 U.S.C.A. § 273a (1974).

Similar options are recognized by the Board's policy on
Management of Sensitive Lands, discussed supra at 16-17.

Yet the

administrative record, including the Director's belated "findings,"
demonstrate that —
explored at all —

to the extent such protective alternatives were
they were rejected in favor of the immediate

proposal on the basis of a rigid and incorrect view of school trust
obligations.
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Furthermore, the Director failed even to make findings
necessitated by his own declaratory ruling on standards for
management of the school trust.

While NPCA has already explained

its disagreement with his interpretation, it is obvious that key
aspects of that ruling would require consideration of a number of
factors basic to any good-faith application of the director's own
tests.

His declaratory ruling by letter dated Dec. 21, 1987, from

Patrick D. Spurgin to Chris Wangsgard, at p. 5 [R.87 ], would
require consideration of least the following factors: (1) Whether
preservation of this state section's scenic, aesthetic and
recreational resources was likely to generate economic advantage,
derived from activities associated with this or other trust lands
that are dependent upon that preservation;

(2) What activities may

generate that economic advantage, and to what extent; (3)

Over what

term would the economic benefits be realized, and to what extent
would preservation yield future economic benefits for future
("open") beneficiaries as compared to current beneficiaries; (4)
What activities associated with the lands acquired by exchange were
likely to generate economic advantage, to what extent, and over what
term?

(5) Whether more advantageous answers to these questions

would result from exchanges arranged with the federal government
under the framework for resolving the patchwork of state trust lands
provided for by MOU between the State and the Interior Department.
The failure to respond meaningfully with appropriate findings
on any of the issues suggested above reflects a fundamental failure
to fulfill the basic requirements of administrative practice
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prescribed by this Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah
Public Service Comiaission. 636 P. 2d 1047 (Utah 1981), Invalidating a
PSC order that had provided for interim application of a "senior
citizen's rate" in distributing the cost of a UP&L rate increase,
this Court held that the PSC had failed to provide findings and
reasons that would support the classification established by the
rate.

The Court was concerned that the agency's rate had been

developed without considering a number of key factors necessary to
explain the lines drawn by its classification, and had failed to
make findings that would support inference about those factors. The
Court emphasized the well-recognized requirement of findings and
reasons in terms fully applicable to the concerns raised by NPCA in
this case:
Although the Commission exercises a form of
legislative power in rate making, it is not the same as
the Legislature. The legality and the legitimacy of its
order rest on well-articulated findings and reasons which
are in accord with governing law. In administrative
matters such as this, there must be findings on all
material issues. [Citations omitted.] Only then can the
interests of the public, the ratepayers, and the utility
be protected. Furthermore, it is not possible for this
Court, without such a foundation, to perform its assigned
task of judicial review. [Citations omitted.]
Perhaps a senior citizen class can be sustained;
however, it is not for this Court to "supply a reasoned
basis for the agency's action that the agency has not
given . . . " [citation omitted]; nor are we authorized to
make findings not made by the Commission. We are
compelled to concluded, therefore, that the order is
unlawful because there are inadequate findings of fact to
support it.
636 P.2d at 1058. Also see Committee of Cons. Serv. v. Pub. Serv.
Com'n, 595 P.2d 871, 878 (1979); Williams v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 29
U.2d 9, 504 P.2d 34.36 (1972).
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To comply with its obligation to provide relevant reasons for
decision and related findings, State Lands should have fully
investigated all reasonable management alternatives for this land
which present less risk than the proposed exchange to values on this
land protected by other applicable policies.

Its findings should

have identified the management alternatives that would comply with
those protective policies, as well as the effect of those
alternatives on the short and long term benefits available to the
school trust, together with any other relevant considerations that
would affect the compatibility of those alternatives with trust
interests.

In particular, rejection of more protective alternatives

such as management to effectuate state-federal exchanges under the
the MOU with the Interior Department should have been based on
detailed findings that demonstrate the incompatibility of that
alternative with the long as well as short term interests of the
trust.
7. A declaratory ruling is badly needed with respect to State
Lands1 appraisal practices
NPCA relies on its prior contentions in Brief of Respondents at
52-55, except to emphasize that the rigorous "trust obligation"
thesis on which the State relies seems strangely in conflict with
its practice, reflected in the record of these proceedings, of
relying on property appraisals supplied by the applicants.

The

importance of and legal basis for that concern is suggested by
NPCA's arguments to the Director in its requests for declaratory
rulings. See Letter dated Oct. 14, 1987, from Terri Martin and Chris
33

Wangsgard to the Board and Director, State Lands and Forestry, pp 46 [R,68-70]

Dated

= 2$%**y /fgf
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for the National Parks
and Conservation Association
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SURFACE MANAGEMENT continued
general ruling as to our position on bankruptty as far as further
leases and that the Board review it for a polic^ matter."

The Board also recommended to the Staff that they look again at the
fair-market value to firmly establish a fair rejntal.
1.600

MANAGEMENT OF SENSITIVE AREAS
June 14, 1984 «
The staff
following or a similar policy.

recommended

the

adoption

of

the

It is the intent of the Board of State U n d s and Forestry to
capture maximum multiple-use benefits from t|he lands entrusted to
the Board and the Division to manage. In the majority of cases, it
is the wish, and experience, of this Board tljiat several uses of the
property can be made at any point in time with a minimum amount of
problems.
It becomes overwhelmingly evident, however, that on
certain State lands unique values to society may overrule the
economic benefits to the trust and may be valued enough by society
to merit designation for perpetuation and preservation of those
values at the cost of other competing, non-cpmpatible uses.
It is the desire of this Board to expand its flexibility in
accommodating the special management needs of these resources, and
the Board requests that the Director explore possible alternative
methods or processes in which lands could b^ devoted to the single,
non-economic uses while maintaining the integrity of the trust.
The alternatives may include, but are not lijmited to, the following:
(1) Purchase of subject property at faijr-market value by other
entities of the private sector or State or federal Government.
(2) Exchanges of land to other State, Federal, or local agencies
or other parties who would have the desire and capability of
managing lands containing the resources in need of special
management.
(3) Explore the potential for the exchanbe of sovereign lands for
trust lands, thereby providing more flexibility in managing kthose
lands.
(4)
Explore legislative solutions consistent with the trust
responsibility which would allow for a land-bank concept which
might remove areas in need of sensitive management from the trust
inventory to be replaced by other lands Which could be managed more
consistently with the trust responsibilities. Under this concept,
school trust lands that justify management for special non-economic
producing uses could be exchanged with lands in the "bank" which
may more appropriately be managed in a manner consistent with
school trust requirements. The areas needing special management
would no longer be subject to the trust requirements, and the most
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SECTION 1 ~

SURFACE MANAGEMENT continued

appropriate agency or entity to provide this special management
could be sought and the lands made available through lease, sale,
or exchange.
The Board complimented the Director on this proposed policy. They
suggested
some
small
editorial
changes, which
have
been
incorporated into the above policy, and felt it should be approved.
Rattle / St. John. Unanimously approved.
"I move we approve this with the editorial changes incorporated."
1.700

GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLANS

1.710

July 10, 1986 Dixie Planning Unit
-- The Staff discussed with
the Board the draft Dixie Planning Unit General Management Plan,
which had been previously sent to the Board for their review. Mr.
Kappe noted that the new Cultural Resources Policy approved by the
Board in this meeting will be incorporated into this plan before
sending for public comments. Mr. Williams, of the Board, noted
that there are some minor revisions that need to be made, but he
would like to see the public comments before making these.
Peart / Bates. Unanimously approved.
M

1.711

I move we approve this."

September 12, 1 9 8 6 — The Draft Management Plan for the Dixie
Planning Unit has been distributed for public and agency comment.
Two public meetings were held. The one held August 5 was for local
government officials only, and the one held on August 7 was a
comment-solicitation meeting for the general public. The results
of both meetings, which listed comments received on the Draft
Management Plan, were given to the Board. In several Instances,
substantive changes are proposed to the Draft Management Plan as a
result of comments received at the public meetings or from the
written comments which were received. These recommended changes
are:
1. Page 12, Recommendation regarding Coordination of Grazing With
Special Use Leasing:
Proposed Language: On those lands where a development lease 1s
granted, wherever possible the developer will allow livestock
grazing on lands under lease until grazing becomes incompatible.
In those instances where the rancher has made approved capital
Improvements under his grazing permit prior to approval of the
development lease, the developer may be required to reimburse the
permittee for the depreciated value of the improvements.
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THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND
THE STATE OF UTAH

WHEREAS, Federal reservations within the State of Utah contain many
thousands of acres of lands administered by the State for the support of
the common schools and other State institutions; and
WHEREAS, land management policies within Federal reservations
severely limit the State's ability to manage State ir^holdings so as to
generate revenues for the school trust fund; and
WHEREAS, the Department of the Interior is committed to cooperating
with the State of Utah in providing for the exchange of State school and
sovereign lands within Federal reservations for Federal lands
administered by the Bureau of Land Management within the State of Utah,
recognizing that the exchanges will enhance and inprove the management of
the National Park System and Department of Defense military reservations;
and
WHEREAS, through State and Federal cooperation, the removal of State
school and sovereign lands from Federal reservations could be
accomplished administratively; and
WHEREAS, the completion of such exchanges is ani appropriate and
necessary policy and objective of both the State anjj the Department of
the Interior;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Department of the Interior and the State of Utah
do hereby agree:
1. As a program objective that removal of State lands from Federal
reservations in Utah is in the best public interest.
2. To complete the removal of State lands from these reservations as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within 18 months of the execution
of supplemental agreements necessary to facilitate specific exchanges.
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3. To negotiate iirmediately exchanges in accordance with the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act exchange procedures or applicable
National Park Service exchange authorities, and the applicable State
processes.
4. To utilize appraisal and valuation concepts, such as those
developed in the in-lieu selection process, designed to expedite the land
transfers and appraisal reviews, to the extent legally and
administratively acceptable.
5. To promote consultation between appropriate agencies of the
Department of the Interior, the Department of Defense, the State of Utah,
and the Navajo Tribe necessary to facilitate the orderly selection and
exchange of lands and to ensure the views of all affected agencies,
parties, and members of the public are considered in the exchange process.
6. To develop supplemental agreements, as needed, to further
define procedures and responsibilities associated with matters such as
valuation, cost sharing, environmental concerns, planning requirements,
and other issues as determined by parties to the exchange.
7. That the State inholdings include all State interests in the
following areas, acreages of which will be determined by the Bureau of
Land Management and the State of Utah after consultation with all
affected parties including, where appropriate, the National Park Service
or responsible agencies of the Department of Defense:
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area
Arches National Park
Capitol Reef National Park
Dinosaur National Monument
Dugway Proving Grounds
Wendover Bombing and Gunnery Range
Camp Williams
8. That State inholdings within the Navajo Indian Reservation will
be considered for removal in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 2 of
the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 Stat. 1419) and under procedures and
timeframes to be mutually determined by the Bureau of Land Management
and the State of Utah after consultation with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and appropriate Tribal officials.
9. To continue to explore possibilities for consolidating State
and Federal land ownership to enhance both State and Federal land
management opportunities.
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FURTHER, the Secretary agrees:
1. To consider making available to the State through this exchange
process those lands on the extremities of and within tjhe Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area identified in the Recreation Area master plan as
available for disposal.
2. To commit the funding and personnel in the department of the
Interior necessary to complete the exchanges within lk months subject to
appropriations.
3. That there may be some unique values on the State lands within
parks and monuments that may warrant consideration for an adjustment in
the exchange process to the extent allowed by law. Such an adjustment
may be based on evidence that may be presented by the State, and shall be
reviewed by the Bureau of Land Management and, where park lands are
involved, by the National Park Service.
4. That the exchanges will be negotiated and implemented by the
Bureau of Land Management in consultation with the National Park Service
and the Department of Defense. Since the National P£rk System benefits
from exchanges within parks and monuments, the National Park Service will
reimburse the Bureau of Land Management for part of the administrative
costs of effectuating such exchanges, with the State also paying part of
the cost. The Secretary will pursue similar cost sharing agreements with
the Department of Defense for exchanges benefitting management of
military reservations.
5. That if the Bureau of Land Management and the State have
disagreement on the respective values of the lands proposed to be
exchanged, the Department of the Interior will establish in the Office of
the Assistant Secretary - Land and Minerals Management, an expedited
dispute resolution process that will handle and resolve these valuation
disputes within 45 days.
AND, the State of Utah agrees:
1. To coordinate directly with the Bureau of Land Management in
selecting lands so as to avoid, to the extent practical, issues which
would hinder the exchange process or compromise the Bureau of Land
Management's ability to effectively manage lands ahd resources under its
jurisdiction.
2. To commit the funding and personnel, including the payment of
certain administrative costs associated with the selections and
exchanges, and determined to be necessary to accomplish the objectives of
this agreement, such payment to be delineated in a future agreement.
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3. To take tncse actions prudent and necessary to expedite the
selection and exchange of lands, including full cooperation with the
Secretary in meeting the requirements of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act and other applicable statutes and in satisfying the need
for environmental considerations, public participation, and the
development of acceptable appraisal procedures.

ENTERED INTO this
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of
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
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